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Summary 
 
 Europeanization and the so-called “democracy-deficit” are two of 
the major issues dividing European publics and national executives. 
The following analysis intends to elaborate on these two subjects as 
they relate to the Prüm Treaty of 2005, an agreement between Schen-
gen member states to enhance cross-border security cooperation, 
which later formed the basis of a 2007 amendment to the EU’s acquis 
communautaire. Participating states agreed to implement data ex-
change capabilities and bolster cooperation of police forces. Criticism 
of the Prüm Treaty tends to focus on two topics: the protection of 
personal data and the role of national executives and parliaments in 
the course of the negotiation process. For this particular treaty, na-
tional executives negotiated in almost total secrecy and at a runner’s 
pace uncommon to the European legislation process. Thus, negotia-
tors bypassed national parliaments and the European Parliament, the 
legitimate, democratically-elected actors that should have been in-
volved in the treaty’s negotiations from the onset. This paper will 
detail the interactions between the different national executives and 
parliaments during the treaty’s negotiation process and reveal how 
European legislative standards were manipulated in order to secure 
support and democratic legitimacy. In most cases, national parlia-
ments could only maintain the role of an ex-post control instrument; 
they could exert little, if any, influence on the contents of the treaty. 
Another popular criticism of the Prüm Treaty concerns questions re-
garding Europe’s differentiated integration. Because the Schengen 
and Prüm frameworks were developed by a minority of member 
states outside the EU’s institutional framework, some contend that 
the EU is beginning the process of fragmentation. Still others argue 
that this legislative flexibility is an asset for the future composition of 
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a widened and deepened European Union. This argument will be 
analyzed within the context of the provisions of the Nice and Lisbon 
Treaties. 
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Introduction: the game of the name 
 The Prüm Treaty, signed in 2005 by Schengen member states and later 
incorporated into the EU’s acquis communautaire in 2007 during the Ger-
man Presidency of the EU Council, sought to enhance cross-border security 
cooperation between participating member states. The agreement, though 
intended to be a complement to Europe’s burgeoning security alliances and 
enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe, sparked a public outcry 
against the Europeanization of member state’s Home and Justice Affairs, or 
in the EU’s official parlance, the European Space of Freedom, Security, and 
Justice. 
 Much of the public’s criticism focused on the fact that the Prüm Treaty’s 
official documents did not adequately reflect the effects these amendments 
would have on the rights of citizens. Only a single sentence in the European 
Council Presidency Conclusions of June 20071 noted the Prüm Treaty’s 
transformation from a Schengen-area agreement to a codified-European law. 
The new agreement was not even considered important enough to receive a 
distinct name. Most analysts considered this behaviour far too laconic, for 
the changes made to European security were indeed profound. Some ana-
lysts consider the new chapter to be Schengen III, following the Schengen 
Agreement of 1985 and the Schengen Convention of 1990. This name also 
refers to the Schengen Information Systems I and II, the systems of data ex-
change developed under the Schengen Convention over the last fifteen years. 
 
1 The conclusions of the presidency are available at europa.eu/european-council/index_ 
en.htm. The one sentence in the conclusions of the German Presidency of I / 2007 is: “The re-
cent decision to integrate the essential provisions of the Prüm Treaty into the Union's legal 
framework will help to intensify cross-border police cooperation.” (see consilium.europa.eu/ue 
Docs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf, p. 7, accessed 18 October 2008) 
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The new agreement will perhaps soon see the development of a substantially 
enlarged European data exchange system – a Schengen Information System 
III, so to speak. 
 Schengen III and the Prüm Treaty, on which the former is based, create 
new cooperation dimensions for European police and justice systems. Yet 
because the treaties’ negotiation processes and enactment into European law 
were largely guarded from the peering eyes of public watchdogs, many 
European citizens suspect an encroachment into their basic human rights and 
civil liberties, as well as a deterioration of the EU’s democratic legitimacy. 
These treaties also touch on the issue of flexibility versus fragmentation 
within the EU. After a brief description of the history and contents of these 
two treaties, this paper will analyze the arguments of each of the three 
above-mentioned criticisms.  
 
The Schengen Agreement and the Schengen Convention 
 The Schengen Agreement of 1985 intended to finalize the completion of 
the European Community’s Single Market, assuring the free movement of 
goods, capital, services, and persons. The Schengen Agreement primarily 
stipulated that checks at common borders were to be abolished in the near 
future. The signing of this treaty on a ship on the Mosel River (the border 
between Germany and Luxembourg) symbolised the free and open space 
between European borders. Yet diplomatic formality – every agreement 
needs a concrete place to be signed – forced signatories to move across the 
river to Schengen, a small town in southern Luxembourg. In 1990, Schengen 
members agreed to properly implement the 1985 Agreement at the Schengen 
Convention. The Convention included the establishment of an Executive 
Committee consisting of Interior and Justice Ministers from participating 
countries; it was perhaps the most important decision in the organization’s 
brief history. Decisions of this body are made by unanimous vote and form 
the legal basis of the aforementioned Schengen Information System. Though 
the Convention came into force in 1993, the complete abolition of border 
controls did not occur until 1995.  
 Perhaps the Schengen Convention’s most important legacy is that a 
group of countries made the deliberate decision to form a forerunner group 
willing to integrate deeper. Sovereign powers of national governments were 
now transferred to European bodies to seek European solutions. The 1985 
group, originally consisting of Germany, France, and the Benelux countries, 
added Spain and Portugal prior to the Convention’s execution. Following the 
creation of the European Union in the early 1990s, Justice and Home Af-
fairs, formerly a domain of national governments, were given a European 
dimension. By 1997, Schengen rules and procedures were integrated into the 
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European Union’s acquis communautaire as a protocol to the Treaty of Am-
sterdam. These rules were binding for future members. In the meantime, It-
aly and Austria joined the original seven countries in the Schengen Conven-
tion.  
 Another significant aspect of Schengen, later acknowledged in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty of 2001, was that it introduced a more 
flexible approach to integration. One of the major provisions of the Treaty of 
Nice explicitly allowed a group of at least seven member states to integrate 
deeper if the states so choose. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam allowed Brit-
ain and Ireland to exclude themselves from certain European Union provi-
sions, but maintain the right to opt-in. The Amsterdam Treaty also allowed 
non-EU members to join the Schengen-area. As a result, non-EU members 
Norway and Iceland joined the agreement in 1991 alongside Denmark, Swe-
den, and Finland (all EU member states). Similarly, neutral Switzerland 
joined in late 2008, along with new EU member states Malta and Cyprus. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the 2004 EU entrants, including Latvia, Lithuania, 
Estonia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, having suc-
cessfully completed accession negotiations, joined Schengen in 2007. The 
agenda of the Schengen acquis eventually began to enforce and standardize 
control of the Schengen-area borders, create a common visa policy, and co-
operate in the fields of police and justice systems.  
 
The Prüm Treaty2 
 The origins of the Prüm Treaty can be traced back to the security con-
cerns Germany brought to the attention of its Schengen partners. Together 
with Austria, the two countries argued that the new enlarged zone of liberty 
creates security risks, particularly for those states that have common borders 
with East and Central European countries. Prior to 1990, cross-border traffic 
was relatively low along the Eastern front, but soon exploded with the 
opening of the Iron Curtain and has continued to rise over the last two dec-
ades. Though EU membership and the abolition of border controls by the 
end of 2007 brought these countries together, it also facilitated the increased 
operation of illegal cross-border activities. 
 As a result, Germany initiated bilateral negotiations with its neighbour-
ing states to increase police cooperation. Bilateral treaties were quickly 
completed with the Netherlands and Austria in 2003. Simultaneously, Ger-
many launched a multilateral security initiative with the Benelux countries 
and France. France soon balked at the so-called “hot pursuit” condition, 
 
2 The original text of the Treaty is available at register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/05/st10/ 
st10900.en05.pdf (18 October 2008). 
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which would allow for the operation of foreign police forces (e.g. German) 
on French soil; the matter was not in accordance with the French constitu-
tion. Austria was later invited to take France’s place. In 2005, the partners, 
together with Spain, signed a treaty in the German town of Prüm, close to 
the borders of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the town of Schengen. This 
agreement became operational by the end of 2006. France, having received 
approval from its constitutional court, joined in 2007 alongside Slovenia and 
Finland.  
 The Prüm Treaty intensifies cross-border security cooperation, specifi-
cally as it relates to terrorism, crime, and illegal migration. Some of the nov-
elties of the Prüm Treaty include (a) the simplified exchange of data, e.g. 
DNA, fingerprints, and vehicle registers, (b) the introduction of document 
specialists to detect false papers, and (c) the joint operations of national po-
lice forces. Debates during the negotiation process largely focused on two 
key issues. The first point of contention was the proposed creation of a cen-
tralized database versus the maintenance of several decentralized national 
databases. Germany suggested the former, hoping to headquarter the new 
database in Luxembourg, but was unsuccessful in persuading others to agree. 
The outcome of the negotiations established national databases with Prüm 
partners and allowed members to make use of so-called national contact 
points. The institutional set-up, however, is left to national authorities. Aus-
tria, for example, operates one contact point for DNA data and fingerprints 
and a second one for vehicle registration data. The second point of debate 
during negotiations focused on the issue of data protection. Prüm partners 
agreed that every request automatically has direct access to data of partner 
institutions. Answers are given in an anonymous “hit” / “no hit” mode. In 
case of a “hit”, the requesting partner receives a reference number (no 
names, nor a list of crimes committed, etc.). Using the reference number, a 
request is then sent to the partner where the “hit” originated, and he/she will 
respond with data and details that he/she is allowed to supply according to 
the national law of the partner country. The delivery and protection of data 
has been an enduring issue of debate (detailed in the Critique I section be-
low). It should be noted, however, that the data exchange program dramati-
cally increased crime-solving rates. The then-Austrian minister of Justice 
Günther Platter labelled Prüm a “milestone in the fight against crime at the 
European level.”3 
 
 
 
3 Platter in a parliamentary committee meeting where he had to report (see http://parlament. 
gv.at/PG/DE/XXIII/V/V_00003/fnameorig_087632.html, accessed 19 October 2008), and at 
several other occasions. 
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Critique I: Human and Basic Rights 
 The major criticism of Prüm centres on the potential violation of human 
and basic rights. This concerns, in particular, the protection of personal data. 
Prüm partners were aware of this risk and subsequently left the issue with 
the national delegations to verify whether the new treaty violates citizens’ 
rights. For instance, the German delegation requested the German Commis-
sioner of Data Protection to testify to the Bundestag that the Treaty upheld a 
high standard of data protection (Kietz and Maurer 2007: 9). The Austrian 
Nationalrat’s respective committee took similar actions, which resulted in a 
similar conclusion (see footnote 3). Still, critics who are particularly sensi-
tive to the violation of basic rights have yet to be convinced. Austria’s Green 
party, whose platform was created during the civil rights movements in the 
1980s, voted against adopting the Prüm Treaty specifically because of this 
issue. The party argues that with access to national crime databases, data can 
spread with little or no controls and “international black lists” of ordinary 
civil rights proponents will be created (see footnote 3). These arguments 
were specifically applicable to protests held at the 2007 G8 Summit in Heili-
gendamm, Germany. Many protesters feared that their personal information 
would be unknowingly spread throughout police stations in Europe.  
 The focal point of the critique is that each member state’s national 
legislation deals differently with the use, storage, and deletion of data (Kietz 
and Maurer 2006: 5-7; Kietz and Maurer 2007: 12-13). The police forces of 
Poland and Italy, for example, do not currently use DNA data. Sweden uses 
DNA data but only in cases where the culprit was imprisoned for a minimum 
of two years. In Germany and Austria, the collection of DNA data is a stan-
dard practice of police investigators in criminal cases. The country with the 
largest DNA database in Europe, Britain, shows no interest in joining Prüm, 
but agreed to share data according to the new Schengen acquis. On the 
European level, this issue came to the floor again in the spring of 2007 when 
the Council of Ministers ignored the topic entirely. The European Data Pro-
tection Supervisor, Peter Hustinx, was not even consulted. He proceeded ex 
officio and published an Op-Ed in April 2007 that criticized the aforemen-
tioned country-by-country approach to data protection. Hustinx stated that 
no general rule exists on data protection in the Third Pillar of the EU. 
 
Critique II: Democratic legitimacy of new legislation 
 Negotiations for the Prüm Treaty’s bilateral agreements were conducted 
primarily by Interior and Justice Ministers. Much of the content was simply 
rubber-stamped from the bilateral agreements between Germany and Austria 
and the Netherlands. Hence, negotiations and agreements were almost exclu-
sively in the domain of national bureaucracy experts. In this process, the role 
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of national parliaments was frequently neglected, given that they are the 
supposed legitimate democratically-elected actors and they house the floor 
where national debates should take place. As Belgian Senator Hugo Van-
denberghe criticised, the role of the parliament as an instrument of democ-
ratic control is at risk: 
 Le parlement n’est pas associé á l’élaboration des projets de loi portant 
assentiment á des traités et conventions et qu’il ne peut exercer aucun con-
trole á cet égard. Il est inadmissible que les parlementaires soient purement 
et simplement liés par les dispositions d’un traité qui est en soi la traduction 
de décisions prises par des fonctionnaires.4 
 The resulting treaty, which indeed encroaches on the fundamental rights 
of citizens, was the result of expedited, closed-door negotiations. Parlia-
ments were often reduced to the role of an ex-post control instrument. Par-
liamentarians could exercise little or no influence on the contents of the 
treaty. Political practice, however differed from country to country, as re-
search from Daniela Kietz and Andreas Maurer demonstrates (2007: 8-10). 
Spain’s Cortez waved the Prüm Treaty through by group voting. In Belgium, 
the government did not involve parliament at all apart from voting for or 
against the negotiated treaty. Germany’s Bundestag was likewise not in-
volved apart from the data protection issue when the expert’s statement was 
requested. A more attentive role was practiced in the Netherlands; its par-
liament was assigned a potential veto on all steps of the negotiation process. 
Yet a silent consent mechanism was in place and required the vigilance of 
parliamentarians to exercise influence. Austria’s delegation reported all of 
the steps of the negotiation process back to the respective parliament com-
mittee. The delegation was keen to listen to critics and incorporate amend-
ments on this basis. The Finnish delegation depended on a parliamentary 
mandate, and thus the parliament could control and reject the outcome of the 
negotiations.  
 
Critique III: Europeanization of Home and Justice Affairs? 
 Two key criticisms exist regarding the Europeanization of Home and 
Justice Affairs: (1) a variation of the “democratic deficit” argument and (2) a 
debate on Europe’s flexible integration. The first criticism concerns the way 
Prüm was incorporated into European legislation. Many argue that the Ger-
man Presidency quickly pushed the issue through the EU’s institutional 
framework in order to finalize it as soon as possible. German Interior Min-
ister Schäuble brought the Prüm Treaty to the attention of his colleagues at a 
 
4 Text available at http://senate.be/www/webdriver?MItabObj=pdf&MIcolObj=pdf&MInam 
Obj=pdfid&MItypeObj=application/pdf&MIvalObj=50335244, page 8 (14 September 2008). 
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February 2007 plenary session of an informal meeting of Justice and Home 
Affairs Ministers in Dresden. Four days later, the Council Secretariat pub-
lished a first draft of a European-wide Prüm Treaty, a document that was 
later approved by the Art 36 Committee, a coordinating body of senior offi-
cials that advises the Council. At a formal meeting on 15 February 2007, the 
Prüm Treaty’s integration into EU legislation was agreed upon. The latest 
Art 36 Committee approved the version that was finally executed at the 
European Council meeting in Brussels in June 2007 (Burgess 2007: 2).  
 Critics argue that the adoption of the new Schengen acquis was too hasty 
and lacked consideration of a number of existing EU procedures. The Euro-
pean Parliament was given no more than three months to gather an informed 
opinion. Moreover, the expertise of the European Data Protection Supervisor 
was not requested. Critics contend that this act was deliberate. EU Home and 
Justice Ministers only actually agreed on a lighter version of the Prüm 
Treaty, one that excluded the obligatory and automatic use of air marshals, 
document advisers, and emergency measures in the event of imminent dan-
ger (the so called “hot pursuit,” or the crossing of borders by a national po-
lice force). Given the hastiness (and some might say sloppiness) of the pro-
cedure, one can argue that Europe’s proud tradition of democratic discourse 
is threatened. EU expert and Professor at the University of Oslo, Mark Bur-
gess, concluded that, “one of the biggest questions about the Prüm Treaty 
and its introduction into EU law concerns the manner in which this happened 
rather than the substance of the Treaty itself” (Burgess 2007: 4). This is par-
ticularly regrettable given the lack of democratic legitimacy under which 
Prüm was negotiated. Prüm/Schengen III leave little to no doubt that the EU 
must address criticism of its “democratic deficit.”  
 Criticism on flexible integration, i.e. whether a group of member states 
can address and implement laws outside the jurisdiction of the EU, ques-
tioned whether this is actually in the interest of European integration. Some 
argue that a group of member states could function as a role model. In a 
Europe of different speeds, some countries should advance first and integrate 
deeper, leaving other member states to follow. Hugo Brady argues that fore-
runner countries could serve as laboratories (Brady 2005). Prüm was a case 
study of police cooperation on a European scale. It turned out to be success-
ful and was thus incorporated into the European legislative body. Franklin 
Dehousse and Diane Sifflet argue that Prüm partners had a very pragmatic 
approach. National executive bodies simply used the form of a multilateral 
international treaty. This was considered both simple and advantageous in 
that Prüm partners were able to bypass the complicated procedures of Euro-
pean institutions (Dehousse and Sifflet 2006; various sections refer to proce-
dural aspects). 
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 Others argue that this flexible approach will lead to increased fragmenta-
tion within the EU. When considering the example of Germany and her re-
lations to neighbouring countries, it is clear that flexibility opened the door 
to widely disparate modes of cooperation with different EU members. Re-
garding Justice and Home Affairs, three layers can be identified. The widest 
and least intensive is based on the Schengen III agreement, e.g. cooperation 
with the Czech Republic and Poland. A more intensive type of cooperation 
that includes all Schengen III provisions is the one based on the Prüm 
Treaty, e.g. co-operation with Belgium and France. The most intensive type, 
one that includes all Schengen III and all Prüm provisions, goes even further 
and is based on bilateral agreements, e.g. cooperation with the Netherlands 
and Austria. One can see that these different modes of cooperation may lead 
to fragmentation. Thierry Balzacq argues that such differentiation lacks 
transparency and dismantles trust among EU partners (Balzacq et al. 2006: 
17-18). Balzacq’s colleague, Elsbeth Guild, adds that a small oligarchy of 
countries imposes their preferred options on the EU as a whole (Guild 2007). 
Guild’s critique is on point given that disparate integration models are initi-
ated in intergovernmental negotiations outside the EU institutional frame-
work, as it was the case with Prüm. The risk of fragmentation is smaller 
when differentiated integration takes place through established instruments 
and procedures within the EU, as was seen in the Nice Treaty. 
 
Flexible Integration, Home and Justice Affairs, and the 
Lisbon Treaty 
 The policy area of Justice and Home Affairs in the context of the Prüm 
Treaty demonstrates that member states have been “tempted to opt for mod-
els of intergovernmental cooperation outside the EU” (Tekin and Wessels 
2008: 26). The yet-to-be ratified Lisbon Treaty attempts to find more bal-
ance on the issue of flexibility and its unintended outcome, fragmentation. 
With the exception of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the 
new treaty makes no specification about flexibility and policy areas. Thus, 
Justice and Home Affairs are to be treated equally with all other policy areas.  
 Under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, flexibility arrangements are 
itemized more precisely than they were in previous EU-wide treaties. The 
provisions identified in the Treaty of Lisbon “provide an alternative within 
the EU’s legal framework” (Tekin and Wessels 2008: 27). The minimum 
number of member states required is raised from eight to nine. This figure – 
one third of the current EU 27 – should adequately raise the legitimacy of 
those willing to cooperate. In terms of procedures, the authorisation of en-
hanced cooperation has been facilitated. The European Parliament will enjoy 
increased rights of participation, and in the Council, qualified majority vot-
ing can be applied in this same respect to all policy areas except CFSP 
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(Tekin and Wessels: 2008, 29). Hence, the hurdle to bring more member 
states on board for enhanced cooperation has been moderately raised, 
whereas the hurdle of national vetoes has been considerably reduced. Only 
time will tell if such provisions will effectively lead to a multi-speed Europe 
or create one of multiple geometries, where a once a proud union may find 
itself at the edge of fragmentation due to the implementation of imperfect 
communitarisation rules, regulations, and practices. 
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